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We look for symptoms of Dutch disease in the Pakistani economy arising from 
international remittances. The presence of endogeneity and uncertainty in our model 
due to the managed float of Pakistani Rupee prevalent during most of the studied 
period requires the use of a probabilistic rather than a standard frequentist technique. 
Therefore, we carry out an IV Bayesian analysis using the Gibbs algorithm. We find 
evidence for both spending and resource movement effects, both of them in the short 
as well as the long-run. Remittances cause an appreciation of the real exchange rate 
and loss of competitiveness of Pakistan’s exports sector along with a concomitant rise 
in the share of the non-tradable sector in the economy. These impacts are stronger and 
different from those the Official Development Assistance and the FDI exert. We find 
that while aggregate remittances and the remittances from Persian Gulf contribute to 
the Dutch disease in Pakistan, those from North America and Europe do not.  
    
Résumé 
Cet article étudie la possibilité que l'économie pakistanaise souffre du syndrome 
hollandais dû aux transferts de fonds. La présence potentielle de l'endogénéité et de 
l'incertitude dans notre modèle, en raison du taux de change administré, peut être 
mieux analysée en utilisant les techniques probabilistiques. Par conséquent, nous 
employons la méthode Bayésienne IV. Nous  trouvons l'évidence de l'effet dépense et 
l'effet de réallocation de ressources, tout les deux. Les transferts de fonds causent 
l'appréciation du taux de change réel et une baisse de la compétitivité du secteur des 
biens échangeables, en même temps que la part du secteur non-échangeable monte en 
importance. Les symptômes du syndrome hollandais sont présents à court terme ainsi 
qu'à long terme. Ces impacts sont plus forts que ceux de l’assistance officielle et des 
investissements directs étrangers, et différents de ceux-ci. A l'échelle régionale, les 
transferts de fonds venant du golfe persique contribuent à cela, mais ceux de 
l'Amérique du Nord et de l’Europe ne montrent pas de signes du syndrome.   
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1. Introduction 
Remittances to Pakistan have seen a sharp and sustained rise in the recent years, 
increasing from under $1 billion in 1999 to over $10 billion today (State Bank of 
Pakistan, 2011). This has not gone without leaving its macroeconomic impact. 
Anecdotal evidence points to links with higher price levels and added reliance on 
imports (State bank of Pakistan 2007). The launch of Pakistan Remittances Initiative 
(PRI) in 2009 by The State Bank, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Overseas 
Pakistanis to attract more remittances in order to cover the chronic current account 
deficit can end up exacerbating these adverse effects.  
Remittances are an important source of foreign exchange for developing countries. 
The volume of remittance transfers to many developing countries, including Pakistan, 
exceeds that of foreign private capital and official development assistance. These 
inflows have led to lower poverty, higher savings and more funds for investment, 
increased consumption and improved human capital of the recipient households and 
communities.  Remittances are found to promote economic growth (Faini, 2002; 
Garcia-Fuentes and Kennedy, 2009; Stark and Lucas, 1988). Rise in remittances has 
also made the developing countries governments less reliant on other financial 
inflows for their foreign exchange requirements. Remittances are also purported to be 
a stable source of foreign exchange (Mughal and Makhlouf, 2011), more so than FDI 
and portfolio inflows, and help countries cope up with difficult economic conditions. 
For instance, in the presence of remittances above a threshold of 3 percent of a 
developing country’s GDP, the relationship between a decreasing stock of 
international reserves and a higher probability of current account reversals is found to 
become weak (Bugamelli and Paterno, 2009). Migrants often lend a helping hand to 
their home countries in the wake of natural disasters  through altruistic money 
transfers.  Remittance  inflows  to Pakistan, for instance, rose substantially in the 
aftermath of the October 2005 earthquake and the country’s worst floods in July 
2010
1
                                                 
1 The amount remitted to the country jumped by 9 percent in the aftermath of the October 2005 
earthquake, in contrast to an average monthly growth of 1 percent in the period 1996 – 2010. 
.    2 
Remittances, however, can lead to the overshooting of a country’s exchange rate and 
hurt its competitiveness,  a  phenomenon known as the Dutch disease
2 . The 
overvaluated exchange rate makes the country’s exports relatively expensive, imports 
cheaper, and thus puts pressure on the country’s current account
3
The  aforementioned  spending and resource shifting effects of the Dutch disease 
which lead to lower competitiveness  have been examined for various developing 
countries. For example, in their study of 13 Latin American and Caribbean countries,  
Amuedo –Dorantes and Pozo (2004) find that a 100 percent rise of remittances cause 
the real exchange rate (REER) to appreciate by 22 percent. Similarly, Bourdet and 
Falck (2006), in their empirical analysis of the Cape Verdean economy, find evidence 
of  adverse  effects of remittances on the country's competitiveness.  Acosta  et al. 
(2009) examine a panel of 109 developing countries for the period of 1990 to 2003 
and find that capital flows from abroad help the exchange rate go up. Kapur (2004) 
argues that the exchange-rate appreciating effect of remittances is stronger among 
smaller developing countries. 
. The additional 
demand arising from remitted money raises prices in the non-tradable sector while the 
prices can not move much in the tradable sector in a small open economy. This shifts 
resources from industry and agriculture (tradable sectors) to services (non-tradable 
sector), making the country’s tradable sector less competitive. Why does this matter? 
In the words of Rajan and Subramanian (2010): “a number of studies (Jones and 
Olken (2005) and Rodrik (2007)) have argued that the traded goods sector is the 
channel through which an economy absorbs best practices from abroad. The absence 
of these learning-by-doing spillovers, which may be critical to long run productivity 
growth, could be one constraint on growth”. 
Remittances have also been associated with declining  competitiveness  through  a 
decrease in the labour supply in the remittance-receiving country (Amuedo-Dorante 
and Pozo, 2006; Bussolo and Medvedev, 2007;  Görlich et al.,  2007;  Kim, 2007; 
Rodriguez and Tiongson, 2001). However, there is no consensus on the deleterious 
                                                 
2 The phenomenon can be caused by any large foreign exchange inflows, such as natural resource 
boom, development assistance, remittances or foreign direct investments. 
3 For instance, Kappler et al. (2011) show that within three years after a major appreciation, the current 
account balance on average deteriorates by three percentage points of GDP, savings are reduced while 
export growth slows down substantially. These effects are particularly visible in the developing 
countries.   3 
effects of remittances on external competitiveness. Rajan and Subramanian (2005), 
for instance, find remittances to be different from other financial flows in this sense. 
Mongardini and Rayner (2009) look for the impact of worker remittances in Sub-
Saharan Africa, and find no link with rise in exchange rate. Grabel (2008) suggests 
that the short-term  impacts  of remittances  are  similar to those of other financial 
inflows, with the differences mostly due to different economic policies.  
Remittances, being financial inflows, are intrinsically associated with the country’s 
monetary aggregates, and hence, influence and may in turn be influenced by the 
country’s monetary policy. Any model studying the impact of worker remittances on 
a developing economy will therefore contain an element of uncertainty present due to 
the role of the country’s central bank. Whether by performing sterilization operations 
in the open market or controlling money supply to combat inflation acceleration, the 
central bank appears in the remittances – real exchange rate equation in one way or 
the other. Given this uncertainty, and the availability of limited number of 
observations, significant number of parameters and potential endogeneity issue make 
the use of standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) techniques unsuitable for the 
problem at hand. The use of probabilistic Bayesian paradigm can help in such a 
situation.  
Though the use of probabilistic approach is increasing in economic studies, 
particularly those dealing with financial economics, this is probably the first 
application of the technique in a study of Dutch disease effects.    
The question of Dutch disease in Pakistan has previously been examined in some 
studies. Hyder and Mahboob  (2006), for instance,  estimate that an increase in 
workers’ remittances of one percentage point of GDP is associated with an 
appreciation of Pakistan’s real effective exchange rate by 0.16 percent. Other studies 
include Ahmed (2009), Haque and Montiel (1992, 1998), Janjua (2007), and Rehman 
et al (2010). However, these studies treat the impact of remittances briefly and suffer 
from  several  methodological and data limitations.  For instance, the resource 
movement effect of remittances has not been studied. This paper is an attempt at 
giving a fuller, clearer picture. Appropriate instrumental variable has been used to 
tackle the potential endogeneity of remittances due to reverse causality between the 
money remitted and the country’s real exchange rate.  Moreover, in assessing the   4 
remittances’ impact on the REER, remittance flows are also disaggregated with 
respect to remitting regions. This helps better gage the differential impact of 
remittance transfers pertaining to different Pakistani migrant communities.  The 
question of Dutch disease is examined using both annual as well as monthly data, 
examining the periods 1980-2008 and July 2000-March 2009 respectively. 
 We also look at the sector-wise effect of remittances to determine which sectors are 
losing competitiveness as a result of remittance flows. By doing this, we are able to 
monitor both the spending and the resource movement aspects of the Dutch disease.    
We are mainly interested in answering the following questions: 
Has Pakistan’s real exchange rate gone up as a result of remittance inflows? 
If so, remittance flows from which regions have contributed the most? 
Has the country’s competitiveness suffered as a result? How, if so, have the inflows 
altered the country’s economic structure? 
In the rest of the paper, we attempt at analyzing these questions. First, we present 
some salient features of the Pakistani economy during the period under examination 
(Section 2). Section 3 introduces the model and describes the econometric technique 
used. The results are presented and interpreted in section 4, both for the yearly and 
short-run monthly models. Section  5  analyzes  the impact of remittances on the 
reallocation of resources between the tradable  and non-tradable  sectors.  The last 
section concludes the paper and provides some policy recommendations. 
 
2. Remittances and Exchange rate of Pakistan: Some Stylized facts 
Pakistan is one of the significant migrant sending countries in Asia. An estimate of 
the number of overseas Pakistanis ranges from the official 4 million (United Nations, 
2009) to the estimated 7 million (GoP Economic Survey, 2009-10), to the anecdotal 8 
to 10 million. The major concentrations of the diaspora are found in Saudi Arabia, the 
United Kingdom, the United States, the United Arab Emirates and Canada. Pakistanis 
resident in these five countries constitute more than 80 percent of the overseas 
Pakistani population  Oda  (2009).  Historically, remittances sent by the overseas 
Pakistanis have ranged from 1 to 10 per cent of the country’s annual output, average 
during the last thirty years being 5%. This compares favourably with other foreign 
capital inflows (figure 1), as well as with many developing countries. Figure 2 depicts   5 
remittance  flows to Pakistan and other South Asian countries.  The Persian Gulf, 
North America and Europe are country’s principal remittance sources (figure 3). 
Remittances to Pakistan first picked up in the 1970's, when the construction boom in 
the Persian Gulf engaged millions of Pakistani temporary migrants. The amounts 
remitted by these migrants peaked in early 1980's, when they surpassed exports as the 
biggest source of foreign capital. These flows slowed down during the cheap oil 
period of late 1980's and the 1990's with the weakening of Arab economies. The Gulf 
war in the early 1990's also had a dampening effect on remittances. The second and 
ongoing phase of growth in official remittances began in the aftermath of the tragic 
events of September 11, when in the financial year 2001-02, formal remittances to 
Pakistan more than doubled. Besides the curbs on illegal money transfer mechanisms, 
called Hundi or Hawala, fears among the migrants in the Western countries, such as 
stricter scrutiny of their capital investments, risk to life or property etc convinced 
them to transfer their savings back home. Strengthening currencies, booming real 
estate sector and well performing stock markets in the home country also played their 
role. Free float of Pakistani Rupee, that slashed the official – market exchange rate 
spread, also channelled more remittances  towards the formal means of money 
transfer.  Though the receipts from all the destinations have been substantial, 
remittances from the United States have risen the most, from a mere $73.3 million in 
2000 to over $1.7 billion in 2008. The United States thus became Pakistan’s biggest 
source of remittances, taking over Saudi Arabia, which has been the top remitting 
economy since the 1970s.   
This recent boom has taken the share of remittances in the Pakistani economy to the 
highest levels since the late 1970s and early 1980s. Remittances have now become 
the second most important source of foreign exchange after cotton and textile exports 
(which make up half of the country's exports), and under current trends, may soon 
surpass them
4
                                                 
4 Pakistan's textile exports in 2009 stood at US $9.72 billion. 
. Being such a substantial source of foreign exchange, remittances must 
generate some effect on Pakistan's exchange rate. This raises the possibility of the 
economy facing the Dutch disease. A cursory look at figure 4 shows a correlation 
between the remittance flows and the Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) of the 
Pakistani Rupee. Pakistan’s REER index gradually fell during the 1980s and 90s. It 
maintained its downward trend in early 2000s despite the aforementioned jump in   6 
remittance inflows. This was mainly  because of higher  inflation in the country 
compared to its major trade partners, as well as an even sharper nominal rise of other 
major currencies against the US Dollar than the Pakistani Rupee. However, by the 
middle of the decade, the Rupee had begun losing its competitiveness and the REER 
index was on the rise
5. For much of the 1980s and 90s, Pakistan’s central bank, State 
Bank of Pakistan (SBP), followed a fixed or managed float policy, before officially 
free-floating the Rupee in July 2000. These days, the bank targets interest rates to 
pursue the twin goals of growth and price level adjustment. It sells and purchases 
treasury bills, and intervenes in the open market to inject or mop up money to balance 
the monetary system. In spite of this occasional intervention policy, money growth in 
the economy has remained somewhat high, consistently in the double digits during 
the current decade,
6 and inflation rate has remained above the comfort zone
7
This preliminary evidence of the Dutch disease needs to be substantiated. For this, we 
proceed and study the drivers of real exchange rate (REER) in Pakistan. 
, putting 
the country’s export sector under increasing pressure. Pakistan competes with other 
developing countries in mostly agricultural and low-cost industrial products. Major 
items include cotton, textiles and apparels, rice, leather goods, fish, surgical 
instruments, sporting goods, light machinery, cement, and petroleum  products. 
Margins for these products are often low in the international market, and even small 
fall in productivity and  price competitiveness can cost the exporters their market 
share.  Figure  5  gives a nonparametric estimation  of the relationship between 
remittances to Pakistan and its exports and imports. Prima faci, there is a negative 
relationship between exports and remittances  (elasticity between remittances and 
exports as a share of GDP is, ceteris paribus, -0.20 as against +0.16 for imports).  
3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1. Econometric strategy 
First, we analyse the impact of our selected annual variables on  Pakistan’s real 
effective exchange rate. Our model can be written as: 
                                                 
5 Pakistan's real exchange index had the same value in June 2009 as in Jan 2001. 
6 For example, the mass of money in circulation increased by 19.5 per cent in the year 2006-07 (SBP). 
7 For instance, the inflation rate rose by 24.3 per cent in the financial year 2008-09. In cumulative 
terms, the economy experienced an inflation of 66 per cent between June 2007 and Oct 2010 (SBP 
2010).   7 
t t t t t
t t t t t
ODA REMIT FDI GRO
GOV CPI OPEN TOT REER
ε θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ θ θ
+ + + +
+ + + + + =
8 7 6 5
4 3 2 1 0
              
     (1) 
Equation 1 can be rewritten as:  t t t X REER ε θ + =  where X is matrix of explanatory 
variables. Here, FDI represents the foreign direct investments, ODA represents the 
official development assistance (the two taken as a share of GDP), TOT represents 
the terms of trade, OPEN stands for the trade openness as a share of GDP, GOV 
represents the public expenditure to GDP, and PROD is the proxy for productivity
8
                                                 
8 Most of these are standard determinants of the real exchange rate. For a review of literature on the 
REER determinants, see for instance, Edwards (1989), Edwards and Savastano (2000) and Rogoff 
(1996). 
.   
Besides, POP indicates the demographic change, M2 growth the growth in money 
supply,  2000 the dummy variable for exchange regime change, and disaster the 
dummy indicator for natural disaster hitting the country. θ is the parameter to be 
estimated and ε stands for the errors. All the variables except for the growth of money 
supply and the dummy variables are taken in their log form (The variables and the 
reasons for their inclusion are explained below in section 3.3). Summary statistics are 
shown in table (1).    
Table 1 Summary statistics  
Yearly variable  Label    Min.      Mean      SD   Max.    
REER 
Real effective exchange rate index 
(2005 = 100)   96.91      134.27   40.382  228.16   
Rem  
Workers' remittances and compensation 
of employees, received (% of GDP)   1.454      4.747    2.430  10.248   
Open   Trade (% of GDP)  25.59   31.13    3.348  38.23   
TOT 
Net barter terms of trade index (2000 = 
100)   57.63   107.71   21.689  150.00   
GOV  Expense (% of GDP)   7.781   11.347  2.382  16.805   
GDPpcw   GDP per capita weighted   11399  15686  1466.366  18851 
GDPpcp   GDP per capita (current US$)  372.4   523.4    91.965  702.8   
Pop 
Age dependency ratio (% of working-
age population)  70.26   84.87    7.101  93.17    
ODA  Net ODA received (% of GDP)  0.939    2.242    0.957  4.984    
FDI 
Foreign direct investment, net inflows 
(% of GDP)  0.102   0.984    0.975  3.904   
IV   Instrumental variable for remittances  1345  2057  5344.937  31128 
ME 
Remittances from Middle East (current 
US$)  0.920   2.977    2.177  7.950   
Europe  Remittances from Europe(current US$)  0.12     0.46     0.246  0.93   
America 
Remittances from North 
America(current US$)  0.110   0.547    0.397  1.500   
Money growrth  Money growth rate   4.314   14.967     5.832  29.301   
TNT  Tradable to non-Tradable ratio         
Monthly variables   Min.      Mean     SD   Max.      8 
 
Along with the impact of aggregate remittance flows, we include three region-wise 
remittance variables to study the corresponding impact of remittances coming from 
the three principal remitting geographical zones
9
 
. The three regions are the Persian 
Gulf (comprising of six Gulf Cooperation Council states of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates), North America (consisting of 
Canada and the U.S) and Europe (mainly the United Kingdom). The three regions 
together account for 90 per cent of Pakistani migrants around the World and a similar 
proportion of remittances. In the following step, we study the REER using monthly 
data. We take imports, exports, remittances, FDI, and money growth rate as potential 
drivers for this analysis. Monthly data for GDP are not available, hence we are unable 
to determine the Balassa-Samuelson effect. Similarly, terms of trade, demographic 
evolution and official development assistance are not included due to data 
unavailability.  The monthly data based analysis can show the robustness of the 
impacts of remittances on the annual REER. Alternatively, it can show the way the 
impact has deviated in the recent years from the over all trend. 
Once the existence of Dutch disease has been inferred through REER appreciation 
mechanism, we go further and estimate the remittances’ association with the tradables 
to non-tradables ratio (TNT) in the country. The course of this ratio, calculated as the 
sum of agricultural and industrial value-added weighted by the services sector value-
                                                 
9 The regional regressions are not instrumented as the R packages used for these estimations do not 
allow multiple variable instruments. 
           
REER 
Real effective exchange rate index 
(2005 = 100)  93.02  100.00  3.021  104.10 
Rem 
Workers' remittances and compensation 
of employees, received (current US$)  84.74  371.60  109.390  602.20 
FDI 
Foreign direct investment, net 
inflows(current US$)  18.30  212.20  237.566  1263.00 
Money Market Rate   Call Money  Rate   0.740  6.336  3.051  11.29 
Export  Imports (current US$)  39560  71550  19783.358  1316 
Import  Exports (current US$)  42880  111100  54946.968  2624 
Money Growth rate   Money Growth rate  -0.063  0.016  0.043  0.334 
ME 
Remittances from the Middle East 
(current US$)  44.2  182.5  73.117  333.9 
Europe  Remittances from Europe(current US$)  5.31  31.31  15.125  66.46 
America 
Remittances from North 
America(current US$)  7.73  91.11  40.880  152.30   9 
added (Lartey, Mandelman and Acosta, 2008), approximates the magnitude and 
direction of resource reallocation through the sectoral movement of resources. 
Before describing the results, we first briefly mention the technique used in the study. 
 
3.2. The Bayesian paradigm: 
The Bayesian method is a rational framework which models all the inputs, implying 
that the parameters are considered as variables. By taking the unobservable 
information into account in this way can improve the quality of the estimations and 
forecasts (Parent and Bernier, 2007).  Bayesian inference provides the benefits of 
exact sample results, integration of decision-making, ‘estimation’, ‘testing’, and 
model selection, and a full accounting of uncertainty (Rossi et al., 2005). We use the 
Bayesian Instrumental Variable method to control for endogeneity. We estimate the 
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X is the matrix of explanatory variables defined in the following subsection. PIBH is 
the instrument for remittances.  
The Bayesian approach requires the specification of prior distribution. The prior can 
be specified as follows: 
) A , N(m ~
-1
δ δ δ ,    ) , N(m ~ ) , (
1 −
βγ βγ γ β A and  V) , IW( ~ η σ  
 (The prior values are given in parentheses) 
  δ m : prior mean  (0)  
δ A : pds prior precision  (0 .01)  
βγ m : prior mean vector for prior on  γ β , ( 0)  
βγ A : pds prior prec for prior on  γ β ,  ( 0.01)  
η: d.f. parm for IW prior on σ  (5)    10 
V : pds location matrix for IW prior on Sigma (0)  
There are several types of priors. We use the non informative prior (also called flat 
prior), giving the mean a value 0. A prior distribution is considered noninformative if 
its impact on the posterior distribution of θ  is minimal. 
The results are shown in the form of moments of marginal distributions of the 
parameters (such as the posterior mean and posterior standard deviation). These are 
the OLS analogues of parameter coefficients and standard errors. To calculate the 
posterior mean, we apply the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method using the 
Gibbs algorithm. The Monte Carlo is a method of investigating the behaviour of 
economic models which are too complicated for analytical solutions to be possible. 
 A system is started off at a large number of initial positions chosen at random, and 
followed  through a numerical simulation using a sequence of random variables 
generated using a Markov chain. For the purpose of our study, we use Gibbs sampler, 
a widely used MCMC method, which provides an accurate estimation of the marginal 
posterior densities
10
3.3. Choice of variables 
. 
 
The real effective exchange rate (REER)  is considered a major determinant of a 
country’s external competitiveness.  It is the relative price of domestic to foreign 
goods. An appreciation of the REER reduces the productivity and profitability of the 
export oriented sectors of the economy by raising their relative costs and by making 
the non-tradables relatively cheaper. Following Edwards (1988; 1989), and Montiel 
(1999), the Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) can be considered as the ratio 
between the relative prices of the tradables and non-tradables, which is determined by 
various  macroeconomic  fundamentals  driving  the internal or external equilibrium. 
The REER can be measured in different ways, each measure appropriate for a 
particular line of investigation. We take real effective exchange rate (REER) index as 
our indicator of choice, defined as the nominal effective exchange rate index adjusted 
for relative changes in consumer prices.  
                                                 
10 The annual and monthly estimations are made using the R Bayesm and MCMCpack packages 
respectively, the latter solves the linear model whereas the former finds the posterior marginal 
distribution.  
   11 
Remittances are taken as a share of GDP. Remittances may cause the real exchange 
rate to appreciate. They can however equally respond to changes in the country’s 
exchange rate. Migrants may vary their remitting behaviour, keeping in mind the 
welfare  of the recipients  and their investment plans. In other words, migrants’ 
behaviour, whether altruist, self-interested or compensatory, plays a role in the 
determination of a country’s exchange rate
11. This means that remittances may be 
endogenous to the REER in our model and thus need to be instrumented. We take the 
per capita output of Pakistan’s top ten remittance-sending countries weighted by their 
respective shares in the country’s remittances, as an instrument for remittances
12.  
The ten top remitting countries being: Saudi Arabia, USA, UAE, UK, Kuwait, Oman, 
Bahrain, Qatar, Germany and Canada. This instrument is intuitive and passes the 
required econometric tests of overidentification and weak instruments. It is highly 
correlated with Pakistan’s remittance flows (correlation coefficient being 0.81) and is 
exogenous to the REER (correlation coefficient being 0.06).  Foreign Direct 
Investments (FDI) and foreign aid  (ODA) as shares of the GDP are the other 
indicators of the country’s private and public financial receipts. We do not include 
portfolio  investment in our model, as portfolio inflows have stayed relatively 
insignificant for most of the period under study
13
Following Lartey (2007, 2008), Prati and Tressel (2006), and Rajan and Subramanian 
(2010),  we  expect Dutch disease effects for development  aid inflows.  Foreign 
assistance to a developing country is often directed at the improvement of 
institutional and human capital as well as various infrastructure projects. Much of the 
resulting increase in demand falls on the non tradables, leading to higher prices and an 
appreciated  real exchange rate. These investments  may foster  higher productivity 
(especially that of the non-tradable sector relative to the tradable sector) and increased 
competitiveness in the long run, which may alleviate or even reverse the previously 
induced Dutch disease effects.    
.  
The evidence from extant literature on the Dutch disease effects of FDI is mixed. 
Lartey (2007) and Saborowski (2009), for instance, find Dutch disease effects for 
                                                 
11Money remitted for investment motives, for instance, would likely be procyclical and may therefore 
push the real exchange rate further up; the reverse may happen in the case of altruistic remittances. 
12 Several instruments for remittances have been proposed in the literature, such as the stock or flow of 
migrants, distance from the remittance sending country, remittances to the rest of the world, 
population, recipient country's latitude, school enrolment, population density etc. Nevertheless, data 
availability precludes some of them, while others are not found appropriate in our case. 
13 In the studied period, portfolio investments never went above 0.02  percent of the GDP in contrast to 
remittances, foreign assistance and FDI  which crossed 10, 7 and 4 percent of the GDP respectively.   12 
FDI, while Athukorala and Rajapatirana (2003) and Hyder and Mahboob (2006) find 
no evidence of real exchange rate overvaluation  (appreciation)  due to FDI. The 
competitiveness enhancing impact of FDI crucially depends on the nature of foreign 
investments. Investments made in export and import-competing sectors lead to 
improved physical and human capital, technology and technical knowledge spillovers 
and  higher  productivity, which should ultimately lead to a more competitive 
economy. On the other hand, if foreign investors gain access to domestic assets 
through hasty privatization and the investment amounts to little more than change of 
asset ownership, the investors may not care to substantially invest in the acquired 
assets’ future, and the investments may not result in higher productivity. FDI may 
well cause the REER to appreciate in such a case.     
 In Pakistan, much of the FDI coming during the recent years  have gone in the 
services sector (e.g. finance, information and telecommunication services). 
 The country has also privatized much of the previously state owned banks and 
industrial corporations. The cumulative impact of these investments on the REER 
may well be positive.  
 
Among the REER fundamentals, country’s per capita or per worker output (taken as 
an indicator of productivity) control for the Balassa-Samuelson effect. The Balassa-
Samuelson effect (Balassa 1964, Samuelson 1964) could arise both due to the 
productivity differential between the country’s tradable and non-tradable sectors, as 
well as due to the productivity differential between the country and its trade partners. 
To examine the latter aspect, we take the ratio between Pakistan’s and its ten 
principal trade partners’ GDP per capita, each weighted by the country’s 
corresponding share in Pakistan’s trade, as an alternative indicator of productivity 
besides the standard GDP per capita variable
14.  We expect a positive sign for the 
productivity variables, as rising productivity leads to higher income and increased 
demand for the non-tradables, thus causing structural inflation. As a result, the REER 
moves up
15
                                                 
14 Pakistan’s ten major trade partner during the studied period, in descending order, are the United 
States, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, China, France, Italy, South Korea, and 
Malaysia. 
. The sign of trade openness, taken as the sum of exports and imports of 
15 This positive association in the developing economies has been extensively shown in the literature 
see for instance (Choudhri and Khan, 2005; Dumrongrittikul, 2011; Lartey et al., 2008).   13 
the country as a share of its output
16
On the other hand, the impact of terms of trade can not  be judged a priori, and 
depends on whether the income or the substitution effect dominates (the REER rises 
in the former scenario and falls in the latter). 
, is mostly found in the literature to be negative 
(see for instance,  Candelon et al., 2007; Edwards,  1989;  Lee  et al., 2008 ; 
Saborowski, 2009). It is mainly because opening up to international trade through 
lower tariff and non-tariff barriers leads to more efficient tradable sector, bringing 
down the relative prices of the tradables and increasing their consumption.  Both 
spending and resource movement effects occur (the former positively and the latter 
negatively), over all benefiting the economy’s export oriented sectors 
The  net effect of government consumption is likewise ambiguous.  Government 
expenditure in developing countries is predominantly spent on non-tradables, 
contributing to real exchange rate appreciation. However, if public money is well 
spent on infrastructure, development and maintenance of public institutions and 
human capital improvement, the country's productive sectors should strengthen and 
the short-term appreciation in the REER should dampen in the long run.  
 
We take age dependency ratio as the primary indicator for demographic change. It is 
defined as the ratio of dependents (persons under 15 or over 65) to the working-age 
population. Alternatively, we use population growth rate. Both indicators put upward 
pressure on a developing country’s real exchange rate, so a positive sign can be 
expected for both of them.  
There is some evidence that monetary policy influences a country's real exchange 
rate, at least in the short term (Rodrik, 2008). For example, money growth, being a 
nominal variable, is usually not considered among the determinants of the REER. 
However, several studies, including Lartey et al, (2008) and Lommatzsch and Tober 
(2004) count it among REER's important drivers. Excess money growth puts upward 
pressure on prices of non-tradable goods, and is associated with inflationary 
tendencies and appreciation of the real exchange rate (Lartey et al., 2008). 
 
Similarly, change of exchange rate regime, if not taken into account, too can lead to 
spurious empirical results (Ball et al., 2010; Caceres and Saca, 2006; Levy-Yeyati 
                                                 
16 The Sachs - Warner trade restriction index could serve as a better proxy, but the data for this variable 
are incomplete and hence, can not be considered in our study.   14 
and Sturzenegger, 2005). In a fixed exchange rate regime, an appreciation of real 
exchange rate increases inflationary pressures through increase in money supply, the 
spending effect of remittances can not be properly neutralized, leading to a greater 
resource reallocation  (Lartey et al., 2008).  On  the contrary, real exchange rate 
appreciation in a flexible regime operates through higher nominal exchange rate. As 
mentioned above, Pakistan followed a managed float till 1998, and after a brief 
transition period, officially free floated the Rupee in 2000. We take a dummy variable 
to account for this de facto change in exchange regime.  
 
Recent literature has proposed natural disasters as another potentially important 
determinant of the REER in the developing countries (see for instance Barajas et al., 
2010, and Christiansen et al., 2009). Since Pakistan has occasionally suffered severe 
natural  catastrophes, we find it appropriate to include the incidence of natural 
disasters as a driver of the country’s real exchange rate. The disaster variable is a 
dummy variable which takes the value of one for a loss of 1000 or more lives, loss of 
$1 billion or 1 million casualties in any given year. In our studied period, six years 
(1992, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2005 and 2007) meet the above criteria, either due to severe 
flooding or the 7.6 magnitude earthquake in 2005. 
 
We consider the period from 1980 to 2008 in the annual, and from July 2001 to 
March 2009 for the monthly analysis. Therefore, we work with 29 yearly and 93 
monthly observations. Data for remittances and FDI have been provided by the State 
Bank of Pakistan, the dependency ratio is taken from the World Bank WDI database, 
data for our the disaster dummy come from Université Catholique de Louvain’s EM-




4.1. Annual REER model 
The findings given in Table 2 show that remittances parameter has a positive 
marginal posterior mean, the posterior mean being +0.29 (Table 2). In other words, an 
increase in remittances leads to exchange rate appreciation. A look at the quantiles 
with three quantiles showing a positive sign confirms the positive (though moderate )   15 
nature of the remittances posteriors. Moreover, if the baseline equation is repeated 
without the remittance instrument, the marginal mean drops to 0.27which signifies 














FDI and ODA show a positive and negative sign respectively, though FDI has a weak 
mean value. Dependency ratio and disaster dummy exhibit positive signs, while the 
remaining variables show negative signs. Age dependency ratio has by far the 
strongest impact of all the variables in the model. The same model is estimated using 
GDP per capita as the productivity indicator, and do not alter our results (Table A2). 
In terms of region-wise impacts (Table 3), remittances from the Persian Gulf show a 
strong positive impact. Remittances from North America and Europe, however, do 
not appear to be associated with REER appreciation. 
Table 2    IV   annual REER determinants 
  Mean  SD 
   
Intercept  -0.660  8.291 
Rem   0.29  0.27 
Open   -0.272  0.825 
TOT   -0.226  0.615 
 
GOV  -0.339  0.451 
GDPpcw   -0.461  0.741 
Pop   2.814  2.104 
ODA  -0.051  0.158 
FDI  0.014  0.153 
Moneygrowth  -0.004  0.009 
Exchange rate regime  -0.068  0.378 
Disaster   0.0362  0.155 
Quantiles 
  2.5%  5%  50%  95%  97.5% 
Interspete  -17.340  -14.655  -0.6186  13.077  15.667 
Rem   -0.23  -0.12  0.28  0.74  0.87 
Open   -1.885  -1.594  -0.2838  1.073  1.327 
TOT   -1.449  -1.241  -0.2286  0.769  0.927 
GOV  -1.207  -1.055  -0.3604  0.424  0.587 
GDPpcw   -1.942  -1.683  -0.4667  0.763  0.965 
Pop   -1.460  -0.585  2.7903  6.190  6.901 
ODA  -0.373  -0.321  -0.0476  0.203  0.266 
FDI  -0.293  -0.231  0.0142  0.266  0.319 
Moneygrowth  -0.022  -0.020  -0.0042  0.012  0.014 
Exchange regim   -0.816  -0.705  -0.0692  0.542  0.653 
Disaster   -0.285  -0.225  0.0403  0.281  0.323   16 
 
 
4.2. Monthly REER model 
The REER lifting effect of remittances is confirmed using the monthly data (Table 4). 
Remittances and FDI respectively show positive and negative marginal mean values. 
Exports and imports have intuitive negative and positive marginal means. The region-
wise impacts of remittances (Table 5) are similar for Europe. However, remittances 
from the Persian Gulf appear to negatively interact with the REER. This contradicts 
the Dutch disease effects found with the annual series. The reason may lie in the 
difference in the length of the time periods examined in the two cases. The monthly 
results pertain to 93 monthly observations of the 2000s.  During this decade, 
remittances from The GCC countries have grown almost every year, in both absolute 
and relative terms. The monthly results are much weaker than the annual ones. 
Table 3: annual determinants (region-wise)    
  Mean  SD       






0.160   
   
 
   
GOV  -0.356  0.127       






0.046   
   
   
FDI  0.062  0.043       
ME  0.350  0.089       
Europe  -0.004  0.105       
America  -0.109  0.048       
Disaster  0.0001  0.040       
Exchange rate regime  -0.047  0.125       
Quantiles 
  2.5%  25%  50%  75%  97.5% 
Intercept  -8.341  -3.126  -0.661  1.936  7.254 
Open  -0.620  -0.241  -0.052  0.128  0.531 
TOT  -0.586  -0.370  -0.268  -0.164  0.048 
GOV  -0.610  -0.439  -0.356  -0.275  -0.103 
Gdppcw  -0.518  -0.218  -0.804  0.065  0.3610 
Pop  0.0259  1.2441  1.848  2.429  3.5952 
ODA  -0.091  -0.027  2.686  0.032  0.0925 
FDI  -0.024  0.035   6.276  0.090  0.1510 
ME  0.1705  0.293  3.502  0.408  0.5293 
Europe  -0.212  -0.073  -4.481  0.061  0.2062 
America  -0.206  -0.140  -1.097  -0.078  -0.014 
Disaster  -0.079  -0.025  6.262  0.0261  0.0798 
Exchange.rate  -0.301  -0.127  -4.824  0.0344  0.1979   17 
This notwithstanding, if indeed remittances from the Middle East have had no Dutch 
disease-causing effect during the 2000s, this should portent well for the economy, 
given the ongoing substantial flows of remittances from the Gulf states.  
Table 4: monthly REER determinants  
  Mean  SD       
Intercept  4.759  0.165       
Rems  0.0217  0.011       
FDI  0.0057  0.004       
Exports  -0.086  0.028       
Imports  0.0574  0.018       
Money growth  -0.170  0.058       
Quantiles 
  2.5%  25%  50%  75%  97.5% 
Intercept  4.437  4.647  4.7603  4.870  5.084 
Rem  -0.0003  0.014  0.0218  0.029  0.043 
FDI  -0.003  0.002  0.0057  0.008  0.014 
Exports  -0.141  -0.105  -0.087  -0.068  -0.03 
Imports  0.0214  0.0451  0.0575  0.0697  0.094 
Money growth  -0.285  -0.209  -0.170  -0.131  -0.054 
 
Here, a caveat needs to be mentioned: Even though the REER appreciating effects of 
remittances found in this study are unambiguous and stronger than those found in 
earlier studies on Pakistani remittances, the effects found over all, are relatively mild 
(They are just a fraction of the impact exerted by demographic factors, for instance). 
This may owe to the strong relationship with domestic savings that remittances to 
Pakistan exhibit (Mughal and Diawara, 2010). Part of the savings that remittances 
generate goes to the tradable sector, thus limiting the loss to the sector through other 
channels. Similarly, some of remittances consumed are spent on imported goods, 
pushing down the real exchange rate (the positive correlation between remittances 
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Table 5: monthly REER determinants (region-wise)  
  Mean  SD       
Intercept  4.662  0.184       
Asia  -0.038  0.012       
Europ  -0.001  0.015       
America  0.0106  0.0076       
FDI  0.0096  0.00418       
Exports  -0.069  0.0277       
Imports  0.0725  0.0193       
Money growth  -0.136  0.0564       
  Quantiles         
  2.5%  25%  50%  75%  97.5% 
Intercept  4.308  4.537  4.660  4.782  5.026 
Asia  -0.064  -0.047  -0.038  -0.03  -0.013 
Europ  -0.031  -0.011  -0.001  0.008  0.0287 
America  -0.0043  0.005  0.010  0.015  0.0257 
FDI  0.0015  0.006  0.009  0.012  0.0178 
Exports  -0.124  -0.088  -0.069  -0.051  -0.016 
Imports  0.0341  0.059  0.072  0.085  0.1102 
Money growth  -0.248  -0.174  -0.136  -0.098  -0.027 
Official development assistance, on the contrary, does not appear to have a damaging 
impact on the country’s exchange rate. This could be due to the fact that these 
inflows, being official transfers, are not spent in the same way as remittances. Our 
results provide evidence to the argument that despite wastage of development funds 
due to bureaucratic red-tape, corruption, and lack of spending capacity, ODA has, in 
sum, improved the national economy. This is hardly surprising given the fact that 
foreign assistance is often directed at infrastructure development and provision of 
public service  projects with high social and economic returns in the  developing 
country, adding to the economy’s productive capacity. Aid also puts upward pressure 




FDI shows mixed signs of Dutch disease inducing effects (the correlation with the 
REER is positive in the annual and negative in the monthly model). This divergence 
may be due to the remarkably high levels of foreign investment in the 2000s that 
reflect disproportionately in the monthly results. FDI remained under $1 billion till 
2003, but rose sharply then onwards to cross $5.4 billion in 2008. This means the 
monthly FDI series probably represents a level of inflow at which FDI to the country 
begin inducing Dutch disease symptoms.   
                                                 
17 See for instance, Tressel et al. (2009) and Torvik (2001) for more on the latter argument.   19 
The effect of FDI on the REER, however, appears to be much weaker than those of 
the remittances. This can be gauged from the sectoral distribution of these inflows. 
Foreign investments in Pakistan have involved both services and industrial sectors. 
FDI to Pakistan has been either in the form of acquisitions of private local concerns 
(e.g. banks, food and beverage companies) and nationalized corporations, or 
domestic-consumption-related investments. Oil and gas exploration, fossil-fuel based 
power plants, communications and financial services together comprised 72 percent 
of foreign investments in Pakistan during the period from 2001 to 2009.  
 
Among other determinants of REER, terms of trade and trade openness both show a 
negative correlation with the real exchange rate. In the case of trade openness, the 
result is expected, and corroborates the evidence generally found in the literature. The 
negative sign for terms of trade implies that rapid deterioration of terms of trade in 
the recent years has pushed the real exchange rate upwards
18
Another notable finding is the lack of support of the Balassa Samuelson hypothesis. 
This apparently counterintuitive result has been discussed in previous studies such as 
Rogoff (1996).  Dumrongrittikul (2011) also find evidence of real exchange rate 
depreciation among relatively rapidly growing developing countries. 
. The strong relationship 
between REER and age dependency ratio highlights the important role demographic 
change is playing in the developing countries. The negligible mean value of money 
supply growth indicates that this nominal variable plays no role in the long run. The 
exchange regime dummy shows a negative sign, meaning that Pakistan’s adoption of 
flexible exchange rate regime has made the country’s exchange rate more 
competitive. The disaster dummy shows a small positive impact.   
 
The results so far have confirmed spending effect symptoms of the Dutch disease. We 
also have some indications of the gradual erosion of competitiveness of Pakistan’s 
export sector (fig. 5). In the next section, we study the resource movement aspect of 
the Dutch disease. 
 
5. Impact on the tradable sector 
                                                 
18 After remaining above 100 throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the country’s terms of trade sharply fell 
from 90 in 2001 to 55 in 2008.   20 
In this section, we analyze the impact of remittances on the reallocation of resources 
between the tradable and non-tradable sectors. This helps distinguish the resource 
movement effect of remittances from their spending effect (Lartey et al., 2008). The 
rising spending power of remittances-receiving households that increases the relative 
demand for services raises the price level of the non-tradable sector. This leads labour 
and capital movement towards the non-tradable sector at the cost of tradable goods 
sector, resulting in the loss of export competitiveness. A clear negative relationship 
will therefore confirm our hypothesis that in Pakistan, remittances have added to the 
loss of competitiveness of its major exports through resource movement towards the 
production of non-tradable goods and services. 
Table 6 :remittances and tradable to non-tradable (TNT) ratio 
  Mean  SD       
Intercept  5.849  2.890       
Open  0.175  0.108       
TOT  -0.080  0.073       
GOV  -0.039  0.070       
GDPpcp  -0.616  0.209       
Pop  -0.456  0.453       
ODA  0.009  0.023       
FDI  -0.009  0.021       
Rem  -0.059  0.029       
Exchange.rate  -0.098  0.057       
Disaster  0.016  0.020       
Quantiles 
  2.5%  25%  50%  75%  97.5% 
Intercept  0.255  3.941  5.825  7.717  11.560 
Open  -0.042  0.106  0.175  0.245  0.391 
TOT  -0.231  -0.127  -0.077  -0.03  0.066 
GOV  -0.177  -0.085  -0.040  0.005  0.100 
GDPpcp  -1.041  -0.752  -0.615  -0.480  -0.209 
Pop  -1.343  -0.752  -0.456  -0.155  0.441 
ODA  -0.035  -0.004  0.0098  0.025  0.055 
FDI  -0.053  -0.023  -0.009  0.004  0.033 
Rem  -0.117  -0.078  -0.059  -0.040  -0.001 
Exchange.rate  -0.214  -0.135  -0.097  -0.059  0.015 
Disaster  -0.024  0.002  0.0161  0.029  0.057 
 
Table 6 shows the findings of estimation using the tradable to non-tradable (TNT) 
ratio as the explained variable. As expected, remittances have a negative average 
impact on the sectoral output decomposition. However, its impact (marginal posterior 
mean = -0.06), is much smaller than those of trade openness, productivity, or the   21 
demographic change
19
Pakistan’s economic structure has evolved in the last three decades, with an 
increasingly important role of services at the cost of the share of the agricultural 
sector
.  This behaviour of remittances (strong REER appreciation 
coupled with a weak relative tradable to non-tradable output.  ) corroborates the 
findings of Sosa and Magud (2010).  
20
 
. Remittances also seem to be among the contributors to this trend. This point 
is borne out by the Kernel density estimation shown in figure 6. Remittances are 
positively correlated with the country’s services sector during the studied period, 
whereas the tradable sector, comprising industry and agriculture, seems to be 
negatively associated. A rise in remittance inflows has pushed up the weight of non-
tradable sector in the economy at the cost of industry and agriculture. However, it 
must be noted that agriculture shows the expected negative relationship, whereas the 
association with industry comes out to be positive. A possible reason for this can be 
that industry has over the years benefited from the increase in demand for 
manufactured goods as a result of remittance receiving households’ rising purchasing 
power. Moreover, remittances have sometimes financed small and medium industrial 
startups, whereas remittance receiving households are often known to neglect or 
abandon agriculture. This last result nevertheless requires further investigation and is 
left for future research.  
On the other hand, foreign assistance shows a small but helpful influence on the 
traded goods  sector.  ODA  to Pakistan has often been directed at infrastructure 
development and provision of health and education, which eventually improves the 
productivity of the tradable sector. In contrast, FDI’s impact on the TNT ratio is small 
(though slightly in favour of the non-tradable sector), which points to the diverse 
nature of foreign investments made in the country, ranging from bank acquisitions to 
fertilizers and pharmaceuticals. This means that FDI exhibit neither the spending nor 
the resource movement effects of the Dutch disease. However, lack of real exchange 
rate depreciation effect suggests that the flows of FDI that accelerated in the 2000s 
have apparently not improve the country’s competitiveness, and the purported 
benefits of FDIs have not materialized.  
                                                 
19 Lartey et al. (2008), in contrast, find a sizeable 1 percent drop in the tradable to non-tradable ratio 
for every 1 percent remittances to GDP increase. 
20 The share of services in the national production rose from 45 percent in 1980 to 54 percent in 2009, 
whereas that of agriculture dropped by a equal 9 percent to 20 percent from the previous 29 percent.   22 
Among other findings, the productivity indicator shows a negative relationship with 
the structural shift ratio. The gradual strengthening of the services sector, mostly at 
the cost of the agricultural sector, is a common sight in the developing economies. 
The negative sign of government spending also underscores this point. In Pakistan, 
much of the federal budget has historically gone on debt servicing, defence, pays and 
perks of government employees, and provision of education and health services. This 
confirms the expenditure bias towards non-tradable goods shown in the literature (see 
for instance, Bergstrand, 1991). 
 
Table 7 : region-wise remittances and tradable to non-tradable ratio 
  Mean  SD       
Intercept  7.424  2.989       
Open  -0.037  0.123       
TOT  -0.056  0.066       
GOV  -0.065  0.074       
GDPpcp  -0.537  0.236       
Pop  -0.739  0.448       
ODA  -0.013  0.021       
FDI  -0.022  0.018       
ME  -0.124  0.039       
Europe  0.1285  0.046       
America  -0.035  0.020       
Exchange.rate  -0.125  0.050       
Disaster  0.0264  0.017       
Quantiles 
  2.5%  25%  50%  75%  97.5% 
Intercept  1.552  5.506  7.411  9.345  13.376 
Open  -0.280  -0.119  -0.039  0.041  0.211 
TOT  -0.189  -0.099  -0.056  -0.013  0.075 
GOV  -0.210  -0.114  -0.065  -0.0187  0.080 
GDPpcp  -1.021  -0.684  -0.536  -0.385  -0.062 
Pop  -1.629  -1.029  -0.733  -0.447  0.126 
ODA  -0.057  -0.027  -0.013  0.00009  0.028 
FDI  -0.059  -0.034  -0.022  -0.010  0.015 
ME  -0.203  -0.149  -0.124  -0.098  -0.046 
Europe  0.0363  0.0983  0.128  0.158  0.222 
America  -0.076  -0.048  -0.035  -0.223  0.006 
Exchange.rate  -0.226  -0.158  -0.125  -9.308  -0.025 
 
The positive sign for the trade openness is intuitive, and supports the broad agreement 
in the literature on the productivity-enhancing impacts of trade liberalization. In terms 
of region-wise impact (Table7).rmittances from the Persian Gulf and North America 
both show negative signs. This confirms the anecdotal evidence of remittances 
financing the real estate boom in the country.    23 
6. Conclusions and policy implications  
The above analysis illustrates that the Pakistani economy exhibits symptoms of the 
Dutch disease as a result of the remittance inflows. Their impact on the country's 
competitiveness appears to be detrimental, even though many households benefit 
directly from them. The results lend credence to the argument that remittances have, 
over the years, caused a shift in resource allocation through consumption of non-
tradable goods and services. The phenomenal rise in real-estate and housing, two 
important expenditures of the overseas Pakistanis, points in this direction. This 
additional demand of non tradable goods and services has pushed up the price level 
and made local production relatively expensive. The net effect is that the country’s 
exports have become relatively less  competitive in  the foreign markets and the 
imports  have become more attractive.  The harmful effects of remittances on the 
country’s competitiveness are opposite to what we find for the FDI and particularly, 
for the official development assistance.  The real exchange rate appreciating effect of 
remittances is more significant than the one caused by other financial flows because 
unlike foreign capital inflows, remittances are the outcome of a gradually  developing 
social process (that of migration), and are not prone to sudden stops or reversals. 
Therefore, their REER affecting tendency can be dealt only partially through 
temporary monetary and fiscal measures. The loss in external competitiveness, in this 
case, needs to be remediated through improvements in internal competitiveness. More 
attention is required for channelling remittances towards productive avenues. In the 
absence of adequate investment opportunities, much of the remittances are spent on 
conspicuous consumption. By providing investment schemes for overseas Pakistanis, 
and promoting small-scale enterprises, these remittances can be harnessed in a way 
that improves the country’s productivity. Development of the financial sector is also 
necessary. Higher financial literacy, a culture of bank deposits and easier and less 
costly  access to banking services can be useful  in this regard.  In terms of 
macroeconomic adjustment, the country needs to rethink its monetary policy in light 
of the increasing importance of remittance receipts. As demonstrated by Chami et al. 
(2006), a country’s optimal monetary policy for a remittance-dependent economy is 
different from the one for an economy with no significant remittances.  The 
competitiveness-affecting impact of remittances can be further controlled through 
judicious use of fiscal policy. Improving labour productivity through skill   24 
enhancement programs and making the taxation regime leaner and more transparent 
can be steps towards this goal.  
In the end, it must be said that real exchange rate is only one of the factors defining a 
country's competitiveness
21,  the WEF Global Competitiveness Index, for instance, is 
based on over 140 indicators of competitiveness. Pakistan’s competitiveness score 
has fallen in both in absolute and relative terms in the recent years
22
 
. In the last few 
years, it has done poorly in comparison to similar and neighbouring economies, even 
relative to those who receive more remittances as a share of output than Pakistan. 
(South Asian neighbours like Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, for instance, receive more 
remittances relative to GDP than Pakistan, but are ranked above Pakistan in the 2011 
GCI ranking). Policymakers, therefore, need to concentrate both on the external as 
well as internal competitiveness improvements to extenuate the effects of remittance-











                                                 
21 According to Eichengreen (2008), a competitive real exchange rate is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for a country to satisfactorily exploit its natural, physical and human endowments. 
22 Pakistan's ranking in GCI fell from 92nd in 2007-8 to 123rd in 2010-11 (WEF 2007, 2010).   25 
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Figures 
Figure 1. Financial inflows to Pakistan 
 
 Source: WB Online ‘World Development Indicators’. 
Figure 2. Remittances to South Asian countries 1994-2009 
 
Source: WB Online ‘World Development Indicators’    32 
Figure 3. Region-wise remittances (1980-2008) 
 
Source: State Bank of Pakistan  
 
Figure 4. REER, NEER and Remittances as a share of the GDP  
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Figure 5. Relationship between Remittances, imports, and exports (Kernel density 







Source: authors’ calculations based on WB Online ‘World Development Indicators’. 
Figure 6: Relationship between remittances and sectoral output shares (Kernel density 
estimation 
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Appendix 
 
Table a1 : Linear Determinants REER  
   
 
Mean  SD 
      Intercept  0.681  4.800 
      Open  -0.374  0.309 
      TOT  -0.192  0.230 
      GOV)  -0.297  0.171 
      Gdppcw  -0.614  0.269 
      Pop  2.857  1.076 
      ODA  -0.047  0.066 
      FDI  0.029  0.060 
      Rem  0.270  0.056 
      Exchange.rate  -0.049  0.179 
      Disaster  0.021  0.061 
      Quantiles 
 
2.5%  25%  50%  75%  97.5% 
Intercept  -8.611  -2.487  0.640  3.783  10.167 
Open  -0.991  -0.569  -0.375  -0.173  0.247 
TOT  -0.655  -0.339  -0.189  -0.042  0.268 
GOV)  -0.637  -0.409  -0.296  -0.186  0.036 
Gdppcw  -1.148  -0.791  -0.614  -0.436  -0.070 
Pop  0.7477  2.141  2.852  3.557  4.991 
ODA  -0.179  -0.090  -0.047  -0.005  0.084 
FDI  -0.091  -0.009  0.029  0.068  0.148 
Rem  0.157  0.233  0.270  0.307  0.384 
exchange.rate  -0.400  -0.166  -0.048  0.066  0.307 
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Table a2 : IV with GDP per capita  
 
Mean  SD 
    Intercept   3.996  8.89 
      Rem   0.27  0.27 
      Open   -0.309  0.80 
      TOT  -0.403  0.53 
      GOV  -0.216  0.49 
      GDPpcp  -0.913  1.02 
      Pop  2.196  1.84 
      ODA  -0.133  0.17 
      FDI  0.059  0.16 
      exchange 
rate   -0.018  0.41 
      Disaster  0.079  0.15 
      Quantiles 
 
2.5%  5%  50%  95%  97.5% 
Intercept  -14.10  -10.60  4.074  18.00  21.37 
Rem   -0.25  -0.17  0.26  0.71  0.82 
Open   -1.87  -1.59  -0.299  1.00  1.24 
TOT  -1.39  -1.23  -0.404  0.45  0.65 
GOV  -1.18  -1.01  -0.218  0.59  0.71 
GDPpcp  -2.85  -2.55  -0.935  0.78  1.12 
Pop  -1.26  -0.73  2.113  5.27  5.76 
ODA  -0.47  -0.40  -0.135  0.15  0.21 
FDI  -0.25  -0.20  0.063  0.32  0.38 
exchange 
rate   -0.86  -0.68  -0.015  0.66  0.81 
Disaster   -0.22  -0.17  0.077  0.33  0.36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 